Corporate Governance Reform, Board Structure, and Its Determinants in the Banking Industry—Evidence from Taiwan

Kun Li Lin, Yuan Chang

研究成果: Article

1 引文 (Scopus)

摘要

This study employs the data of twenty-seven banks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2000–11 to examine the determinants of board structure, e.g., board size and the independent directors ratio. The evidence shows that bank size, the degree of revenue diversification, and the CEO’s shareholding are positively associated with the independent directors ratio. A higher outside block shareholding is correlated with a larger board size and a higher independent directors ratio. As the creditors’ stake decreases, a larger board and greater board independence are required to maintain internal corporate governance. Finally, banks with M&A activity tend to downsize their board sizes and reduce board independence in the subsequent period.

原文English
頁(從 - 到)2001-2017
頁數17
期刊Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
52
發行號9
DOIs
出版狀態Published - 2016 九月 1

指紋

Board size
Corporate governance reform
Taiwan
Banking
Independent directors
Board structure
Board independence
Shareholding
Revenue
Chief executive officer
Diversification
Bank size
Corporate governance
Taiwan Stock Exchange

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

引用此文

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