摘要
Certificateless public-key cryptography has conquered both the certificate management problem in the traditional public-key cryptography and the key escrow problem in the ID-based public-key cryptography. Certificateless authenticated key exchange (CLAKE) protocol is an important primitive of the certificateless public-key cryptography. A CLAKE protocol is employed to provide both mutual authentication and establishing a session key between two participators. Indeed, all conventional public-key cryptographies have encountered a new kind of attack, named 'side-channel attacks'. Fortunately, leakage-resilient cryptography is a flexible approach to withstand such attacks. However, the design of leakage-resilient CLAKE (LR-CLAKE) protocols is not studied. In the article, by extending the well-known extended-Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, we present the security notions (adversary model) of LR-CLAKE protocols, called continual-leakage-resilient eCK (CLReCK) model. The first LR-CLAKE protocol withstanding side-channel attacks is proposed. By employing the proof technique of the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we formally prove the security of our protocol in the CLReCK model.
原文 | English |
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文章編號 | 9133077 |
頁(從 - 到) | 121795-121810 |
頁數 | 16 |
期刊 | IEEE Access |
卷 | 8 |
DOIs | |
出版狀態 | Published - 2020 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Science(all)
- Materials Science(all)
- Engineering(all)