What drives the dating game of executive options exercise? Evidence from Taiwan

Ming-Cheng Wu, Hung Gay Fung, Yi Ting Huang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Examining Taiwanese firms from 2002 to 2008, this paper investigates the motivations behind backdating the exercising of executive stock options. The probability of suspect exercises (backdating) is positively related to the firm's stock return, the value of the option, tax savings, institutional ownership and the extent of CEO equity ownership and negatively related to firm-specific risk and the use of Big Four accounting firms. Tax incentives motivate executives to backdate the exercise date, implying that the greater the potential for larger tax savings, the greater the likelihood of backdating. Backdating usually occurs in firms that have heavy ownership by the CEO, have more claims to executive stock options and are not family-run, confirming the presence of the agency cost problem.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)605-625
Number of pages21
JournalAccounting and Finance
Volume52
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Jun 1

Fingerprint

Executive options
Taiwan
Exercise
Backdating
Chief executive officer
Tax
Executive stock options
Savings
Accounting firms
Equity ownership
Stock returns
Agency costs
Tax incentives
Ownership
Institutional ownership

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Wu, Ming-Cheng ; Fung, Hung Gay ; Huang, Yi Ting. / What drives the dating game of executive options exercise? Evidence from Taiwan. In: Accounting and Finance. 2012 ; Vol. 52, No. 2. pp. 605-625.
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What drives the dating game of executive options exercise? Evidence from Taiwan. / Wu, Ming-Cheng; Fung, Hung Gay; Huang, Yi Ting.

In: Accounting and Finance, Vol. 52, No. 2, 01.06.2012, p. 605-625.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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