The effect of Director's individual and family shareholdings on firm performance

Tsung Che Wu, Ming hsiang Huang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The relation between firm performance and shareholding is a critical issue in corporate governance. In this paper, we examine if significant associations exist between firm performance and (1) directors' shareholdings or (2) directors' family shareholdings among Taiwanese listed firms. After addressing for possible endogeneity and controlling for firm specific variables, we find a positive association between executive director's shareholding and firm performance. Consistent with incentive effect in agency theory, this result indicates that executive directors have incentive to maximize firms' value. Also, we find that executive directors' family shareholding is positively related to firm performance, which implies that executive directors may be motivated by their family members to improve firm value. The results also imply that the majority-minority agency problem can be mitigated when director's family welfare is at stake. In addition, we divide research sample into subsets to accommodate the effect of mandatory independent director regulation in Taiwan since 2007.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)51-62
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Journal of Financial Research
Volume9
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Oct 1

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Shareholding
Firm performance
Firm value
Incentives
Incentive effect
Independent directors
Taiwan
Minorities
Agency problems
Corporate governance
Agency theory
Endogeneity

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Accounting
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Cite this

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The effect of Director's individual and family shareholdings on firm performance. / Wu, Tsung Che; Huang, Ming hsiang.

In: International Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 9, No. 4, 01.10.2018, p. 51-62.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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