To provide mutual authentication and communication confidentiality between mobile clients and servers, numerous identity-based authenticated key agreement (ID-AKA) protocols were proposed to authenticate each other while constructing a common session key. In most of the existing ID-AKA protocols, ephemeral secrets (random values) are involved in the computations of the common session key between mobile client and server. Thus, these ID-AKA protocols might become vulnerable because of the ephemeral-secret-leakage (ESL) attacks in the sense that if the involved ephemeral secrets are compromised, an adversary could compute session keys and reveal the private keys of participants in an AKA protocol. Very recently, 2 ID-AKA protocols were proposed to withstand the ESL attacks. One of them is suitable for single server environment and requires no pairing operations on the mobile client side. The other one fits multi-server environments, but requires 2 expensive pairing operations. In this article, we present a strongly secure ID-AKA protocol resisting ESL attacks under mobile multi-server environments. By performance analysis and comparisons, we demonstrate that our protocol requires the lowest communication overhead, does not require any pairing operations, and is well suitable for mobile devices with limited computing capability. For security analysis, our protocol is provably secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering