Secure certificateless signature with revocation in the standard model

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Certificateless public key cryptography is very attractive in solving the key escrow problem which is inherent in identity- (ID-) based public key cryptography. In the past, a large number of certificateless cryptographic schemes and protocols were presented, but a secure certificateless signature in the standard model (without random oracles) is still not accessible until now. To the best of our knowledge, all the previously proposed certificateless signature schemes were insecure under a considerably strong security model in the sense that they suffered from outsiders' key replacement attacks or the attacks from the key generation center (KGC). In this paper, we propose a certificateless signature scheme without random oracles. Moreover, our scheme is secure under the strong security model and provides a public revocation mechanism, called revocable certificateless signature (RCLS). Under the standard computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we formally demonstrate that our scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks.

Original languageEnglish
Article number728591
JournalMathematical Problems in Engineering
Volume2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Fingerprint

Revocation
Public key cryptography
Standard Model
Public Key Cryptography
Random Oracle
Signature
Security Model
Attack
Signature Scheme
Identity-based Cryptography
Diffie-Hellman
Replacement
Demonstrate

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

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abstract = "Certificateless public key cryptography is very attractive in solving the key escrow problem which is inherent in identity- (ID-) based public key cryptography. In the past, a large number of certificateless cryptographic schemes and protocols were presented, but a secure certificateless signature in the standard model (without random oracles) is still not accessible until now. To the best of our knowledge, all the previously proposed certificateless signature schemes were insecure under a considerably strong security model in the sense that they suffered from outsiders' key replacement attacks or the attacks from the key generation center (KGC). In this paper, we propose a certificateless signature scheme without random oracles. Moreover, our scheme is secure under the strong security model and provides a public revocation mechanism, called revocable certificateless signature (RCLS). Under the standard computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we formally demonstrate that our scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks.",
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Secure certificateless signature with revocation in the standard model. / Tsai, Tung Tso; Huang, Sen Shan; Tseng, Yuh Min.

In: Mathematical Problems in Engineering, Vol. 2014, 728591, 2014.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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