Abstract
Recently, numerous leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes have been proposed to resist side-channel attacks which adopt several properties resulting from practical implementations of cryptographic protocols/schemes to leak partial information of secret (or private) keys. Certificateless public key cryptography solves both certificate management problem in conventional public key cryptography and the key escrow problem in ID-based public key cryptography. However, there is little work on studying the design of certificateless cryptographic schemes resisting to side-channel attacks. In the article, the first leakage-resilient certificateless signature (LR-CLS) scheme is proposed. In the generic bilinear group model, the proposed scheme is demonstrated to possess existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the continual leakage model for both Type I and Type II adversaries.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Conference on Applied System Innovation |
| Subtitle of host publication | Applied System Innovation for Modern Technology, ICASI 2017 |
| Editors | Teen-Hang Meen, Artde Donald Kin-Tak Lam, Stephen D. Prior |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
| Pages | 1263-1266 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781509048977 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 Jul 21 |
| Event | 2017 IEEE International Conference on Applied System Innovation, ICASI 2017 - Sapporo, Japan Duration: 2017 May 13 → 2017 May 17 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Conference on Applied System Innovation: Applied System Innovation for Modern Technology, ICASI 2017 |
|---|
Other
| Other | 2017 IEEE International Conference on Applied System Innovation, ICASI 2017 |
|---|---|
| Country | Japan |
| City | Sapporo |
| Period | 17-05-13 → 17-05-17 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Computer Science Applications
- Hardware and Architecture
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
- Mechanical Engineering
- Media Technology
- Health Informatics
- Instrumentation
Cite this
}
Secure certificateless signature resisting to continual leakage attacks. / Tseng, Yuh Min; Huang, Sen Shan; Wu, Jui Di.
Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Conference on Applied System Innovation: Applied System Innovation for Modern Technology, ICASI 2017. ed. / Teen-Hang Meen; Artde Donald Kin-Tak Lam; Stephen D. Prior. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. p. 1263-1266 7988127 (Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Conference on Applied System Innovation: Applied System Innovation for Modern Technology, ICASI 2017).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
TY - GEN
T1 - Secure certificateless signature resisting to continual leakage attacks
AU - Tseng, Yuh Min
AU - Huang, Sen Shan
AU - Wu, Jui Di
PY - 2017/7/21
Y1 - 2017/7/21
N2 - Recently, numerous leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes have been proposed to resist side-channel attacks which adopt several properties resulting from practical implementations of cryptographic protocols/schemes to leak partial information of secret (or private) keys. Certificateless public key cryptography solves both certificate management problem in conventional public key cryptography and the key escrow problem in ID-based public key cryptography. However, there is little work on studying the design of certificateless cryptographic schemes resisting to side-channel attacks. In the article, the first leakage-resilient certificateless signature (LR-CLS) scheme is proposed. In the generic bilinear group model, the proposed scheme is demonstrated to possess existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the continual leakage model for both Type I and Type II adversaries.
AB - Recently, numerous leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes have been proposed to resist side-channel attacks which adopt several properties resulting from practical implementations of cryptographic protocols/schemes to leak partial information of secret (or private) keys. Certificateless public key cryptography solves both certificate management problem in conventional public key cryptography and the key escrow problem in ID-based public key cryptography. However, there is little work on studying the design of certificateless cryptographic schemes resisting to side-channel attacks. In the article, the first leakage-resilient certificateless signature (LR-CLS) scheme is proposed. In the generic bilinear group model, the proposed scheme is demonstrated to possess existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the continual leakage model for both Type I and Type II adversaries.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85028532421&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85028532421&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICASI.2017.7988127
DO - 10.1109/ICASI.2017.7988127
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85028532421
T3 - Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Conference on Applied System Innovation: Applied System Innovation for Modern Technology, ICASI 2017
SP - 1263
EP - 1266
BT - Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Conference on Applied System Innovation
A2 - Meen, Teen-Hang
A2 - Lam, Artde Donald Kin-Tak
A2 - Prior, Stephen D.
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ER -