Abstract
A signature scheme is one of the important primitives in modern cryptography, which may offer functionalities of user identification, non-repudiation, and message authentication. With the advent of identity (ID)-based public key systems with bilinear pairings defined on elliptic curves, many ID-based signature schemes have been proposed. Like certificate-based public key systems, any ID-based public key system must provide a revocation method to revoke misbehaving users. There was little work on studying the revocation problem of ID-based public key systems, and no ID-based signature scheme deals with how to revoke the signing ability of misbehaving users. Quite recently, Tseng and Tsai presented a practical revocation mechanism using a public channel for ID-based public key systems. In this paper, we adopt Tseng and Tsai's revocation concept to define the new framework and security notions of revocable ID-based signature (RIBS) scheme and propose the first RIBS scheme in the standard model. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we demonstrate that the proposed RIBS scheme is provably secure while remaining efficient for signing and verification as compared with previously proposed ID-based signature schemes.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1250-1260 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Security and Communication Networks |
Volume | 6 |
Issue number | 10 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2013 Oct |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Information Systems
- Computer Networks and Communications