Leakage-resilient ID-based signature scheme in the generic bilinear group model

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Security mechanisms in the traditional cryptography have been modeled under the assumption that secret values (keys) are completely hidden to an adversary. Indeed, a number of side-channel attacks (e.g., timing, power, fault, etc.) have been demonstrated to obtain partial information about secret keys. Leakage-resilient cryptography is a countermeasure to withstand side-channel attacks. Recently, a large number of leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes or protocols have been proposed to resist various side-channel attacks. Up to now, no work has been done on leakage-resilient identity-based signature (LR-IBS). In this article, we propose the first LR-IBS scheme based on Galindo and Vivek's leakage-resilient signature. In the generic bilinear group model, we formally prove that our LR-IBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against identity and adaptive chosen message attacks under the continual leakage model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3987-4001
Number of pages15
JournalSecurity and Communication Networks
Volume9
Issue number17
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Nov 25

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Cryptography
Side channel attack

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Information Systems
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

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abstract = "Security mechanisms in the traditional cryptography have been modeled under the assumption that secret values (keys) are completely hidden to an adversary. Indeed, a number of side-channel attacks (e.g., timing, power, fault, etc.) have been demonstrated to obtain partial information about secret keys. Leakage-resilient cryptography is a countermeasure to withstand side-channel attacks. Recently, a large number of leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes or protocols have been proposed to resist various side-channel attacks. Up to now, no work has been done on leakage-resilient identity-based signature (LR-IBS). In this article, we propose the first LR-IBS scheme based on Galindo and Vivek's leakage-resilient signature. In the generic bilinear group model, we formally prove that our LR-IBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against identity and adaptive chosen message attacks under the continual leakage model.",
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Leakage-resilient ID-based signature scheme in the generic bilinear group model. / Wu, Jui Di; Tseng, Yuh-Min; Huang, Sen-Shan.

In: Security and Communication Networks, Vol. 9, No. 17, 25.11.2016, p. 3987-4001.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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