Abstract
Security mechanisms in the traditional cryptography have been modeled under the assumption that secret values (keys) are completely hidden to an adversary. Indeed, a number of side-channel attacks (e.g., timing, power, fault, etc.) have been demonstrated to obtain partial information about secret keys. Leakage-resilient cryptography is a countermeasure to withstand side-channel attacks. Recently, a large number of leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes or protocols have been proposed to resist various side-channel attacks. Up to now, no work has been done on leakage-resilient identity-based signature (LR-IBS). In this article, we propose the first LR-IBS scheme based on Galindo and Vivek's leakage-resilient signature. In the generic bilinear group model, we formally prove that our LR-IBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against identity and adaptive chosen message attacks under the continual leakage model.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3987-4001 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Security and Communication Networks |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 17 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 Nov 25 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Information Systems
- Computer Networks and Communications
Cite this
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Leakage-resilient ID-based signature scheme in the generic bilinear group model. / Wu, Jui Di; Tseng, Yuh-Min; Huang, Sen-Shan.
In: Security and Communication Networks, Vol. 9, No. 17, 25.11.2016, p. 3987-4001.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Leakage-resilient ID-based signature scheme in the generic bilinear group model
AU - Wu, Jui Di
AU - Tseng, Yuh-Min
AU - Huang, Sen-Shan
PY - 2016/11/25
Y1 - 2016/11/25
N2 - Security mechanisms in the traditional cryptography have been modeled under the assumption that secret values (keys) are completely hidden to an adversary. Indeed, a number of side-channel attacks (e.g., timing, power, fault, etc.) have been demonstrated to obtain partial information about secret keys. Leakage-resilient cryptography is a countermeasure to withstand side-channel attacks. Recently, a large number of leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes or protocols have been proposed to resist various side-channel attacks. Up to now, no work has been done on leakage-resilient identity-based signature (LR-IBS). In this article, we propose the first LR-IBS scheme based on Galindo and Vivek's leakage-resilient signature. In the generic bilinear group model, we formally prove that our LR-IBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against identity and adaptive chosen message attacks under the continual leakage model.
AB - Security mechanisms in the traditional cryptography have been modeled under the assumption that secret values (keys) are completely hidden to an adversary. Indeed, a number of side-channel attacks (e.g., timing, power, fault, etc.) have been demonstrated to obtain partial information about secret keys. Leakage-resilient cryptography is a countermeasure to withstand side-channel attacks. Recently, a large number of leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes or protocols have been proposed to resist various side-channel attacks. Up to now, no work has been done on leakage-resilient identity-based signature (LR-IBS). In this article, we propose the first LR-IBS scheme based on Galindo and Vivek's leakage-resilient signature. In the generic bilinear group model, we formally prove that our LR-IBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against identity and adaptive chosen message attacks under the continual leakage model.
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U2 - 10.1002/sec.1580
DO - 10.1002/sec.1580
M3 - Article
VL - 9
SP - 3987
EP - 4001
JO - Security and Communication Networks
JF - Security and Communication Networks
SN - 1939-0114
IS - 17
ER -