Abstract
The previous adversary models of public key cryptography usually have a nature assump-Tion that permanent/temporary secret (private) keys must be kept safely and internal secret states are not leaked to an adversary. However, in practice, it is difficult to keep away from all possible kinds of leakage on these secret data due to a new kind of threat, called "side-channel attacks". By side-channel attacks, an adversary could obtain partial information of these secret data so that some existing adversary models could be insufficient. Indeed, the study of leakage-resilient cryptogra-phy resistant to side-channel attacks has received significant attention recently. Up to date, no work has been done on the design of leakage-resilient certificateless key encapsulation (LR-CL-KE) or public key encryption (LR-CL-PKE) schemes under the continual leakage model. In this article, we propose the first LR-CL-KE scheme under the continual leakage model.Moreover, in the generic bi-linear group (GBG) model, we formally prove that the proposed LR-CL-KE scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 125-155 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | Informatica (Netherlands) |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 Jan 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Information Systems
- Applied Mathematics
Cite this
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Leakage-resilient certificateless key encapsulation scheme. / Wu, Jui Di; Tseng, Yuh-Min; Huang, Sen-Shan; Chou, Wei Chieh.
In: Informatica (Netherlands), Vol. 29, No. 1, 01.01.2018, p. 125-155.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Leakage-resilient certificateless key encapsulation scheme
AU - Wu, Jui Di
AU - Tseng, Yuh-Min
AU - Huang, Sen-Shan
AU - Chou, Wei Chieh
PY - 2018/1/1
Y1 - 2018/1/1
N2 - The previous adversary models of public key cryptography usually have a nature assump-Tion that permanent/temporary secret (private) keys must be kept safely and internal secret states are not leaked to an adversary. However, in practice, it is difficult to keep away from all possible kinds of leakage on these secret data due to a new kind of threat, called "side-channel attacks". By side-channel attacks, an adversary could obtain partial information of these secret data so that some existing adversary models could be insufficient. Indeed, the study of leakage-resilient cryptogra-phy resistant to side-channel attacks has received significant attention recently. Up to date, no work has been done on the design of leakage-resilient certificateless key encapsulation (LR-CL-KE) or public key encryption (LR-CL-PKE) schemes under the continual leakage model. In this article, we propose the first LR-CL-KE scheme under the continual leakage model.Moreover, in the generic bi-linear group (GBG) model, we formally prove that the proposed LR-CL-KE scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries.
AB - The previous adversary models of public key cryptography usually have a nature assump-Tion that permanent/temporary secret (private) keys must be kept safely and internal secret states are not leaked to an adversary. However, in practice, it is difficult to keep away from all possible kinds of leakage on these secret data due to a new kind of threat, called "side-channel attacks". By side-channel attacks, an adversary could obtain partial information of these secret data so that some existing adversary models could be insufficient. Indeed, the study of leakage-resilient cryptogra-phy resistant to side-channel attacks has received significant attention recently. Up to date, no work has been done on the design of leakage-resilient certificateless key encapsulation (LR-CL-KE) or public key encryption (LR-CL-PKE) schemes under the continual leakage model. In this article, we propose the first LR-CL-KE scheme under the continual leakage model.Moreover, in the generic bi-linear group (GBG) model, we formally prove that the proposed LR-CL-KE scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85053870579&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.15388/Informatica.2018.161
DO - 10.15388/Informatica.2018.161
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85053870579
VL - 29
SP - 125
EP - 155
JO - Informatica
JF - Informatica
SN - 0868-4952
IS - 1
ER -