Leakage-resilient certificateless key encapsulation scheme

Jui Di Wu, Yuh Min Tseng, Sen Shan Huang, Wei Chieh Chou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The previous adversary models of public key cryptography usually have a nature assump-Tion that permanent/temporary secret (private) keys must be kept safely and internal secret states are not leaked to an adversary. However, in practice, it is difficult to keep away from all possible kinds of leakage on these secret data due to a new kind of threat, called "side-channel attacks". By side-channel attacks, an adversary could obtain partial information of these secret data so that some existing adversary models could be insufficient. Indeed, the study of leakage-resilient cryptogra-phy resistant to side-channel attacks has received significant attention recently. Up to date, no work has been done on the design of leakage-resilient certificateless key encapsulation (LR-CL-KE) or public key encryption (LR-CL-PKE) schemes under the continual leakage model. In this article, we propose the first LR-CL-KE scheme under the continual leakage model.Moreover, in the generic bi-linear group (GBG) model, we formally prove that the proposed LR-CL-KE scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)125-155
Number of pages31
JournalInformatica (Netherlands)
Volume29
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jan 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Information Systems
  • Applied Mathematics

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