Leakage-free ID-based signature

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Digital signature, one of cryptographic primitives, provides the integrity, authentication and non-repudiation of messages. In the past decade, ID-based signature (IBS) based on bilinear pairings has attracted significant attention. And a large number of IBS schemes have been proposed and most of them are probabilistic. In the signing phase of those probabilistic IBS schemes, random numbers (or ephemeral secrets) are used to generate signatures. Ephemeral secrets could be compromised if they are pre-computed and stored in insecure memory. In such a case, one can reveal the private key of the signer from the corresponding signature, termed ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks. In this article, we define a novel security notion for IBS schemes to capture ESL attacks. Based on this notion, we propose the first IBS scheme resistant to ESL attacks, called the leakage-free IBS scheme. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we demonstrate that the proposed leakage-free IBS scheme is provably secure in the new security notion. When compared with the probabilistic IBS schemes, our scheme is demonstrated to have higher security with affordable price in performance.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)750-757
Number of pages8
JournalComputer Journal
Volume58
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Jan 1

Fingerprint

Electronic document identification systems
Authentication
Data storage equipment

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Tseng, Yuh Min ; Tsai, Tung Tso ; Huang, Sen Shan. / Leakage-free ID-based signature. In: Computer Journal. 2013 ; Vol. 58, No. 4. pp. 750-757.
@article{f668346becf24858b82cd2b1a1aa7c00,
title = "Leakage-free ID-based signature",
abstract = "Digital signature, one of cryptographic primitives, provides the integrity, authentication and non-repudiation of messages. In the past decade, ID-based signature (IBS) based on bilinear pairings has attracted significant attention. And a large number of IBS schemes have been proposed and most of them are probabilistic. In the signing phase of those probabilistic IBS schemes, random numbers (or ephemeral secrets) are used to generate signatures. Ephemeral secrets could be compromised if they are pre-computed and stored in insecure memory. In such a case, one can reveal the private key of the signer from the corresponding signature, termed ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks. In this article, we define a novel security notion for IBS schemes to capture ESL attacks. Based on this notion, we propose the first IBS scheme resistant to ESL attacks, called the leakage-free IBS scheme. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we demonstrate that the proposed leakage-free IBS scheme is provably secure in the new security notion. When compared with the probabilistic IBS schemes, our scheme is demonstrated to have higher security with affordable price in performance.",
author = "Tseng, {Yuh Min} and Tsai, {Tung Tso} and Huang, {Sen Shan}",
year = "2013",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/comjnl/bxt116",
language = "English",
volume = "58",
pages = "750--757",
journal = "Computer Journal",
issn = "0010-4620",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "4",

}

Leakage-free ID-based signature. / Tseng, Yuh Min; Tsai, Tung Tso; Huang, Sen Shan.

In: Computer Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4, 01.01.2013, p. 750-757.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Leakage-free ID-based signature

AU - Tseng, Yuh Min

AU - Tsai, Tung Tso

AU - Huang, Sen Shan

PY - 2013/1/1

Y1 - 2013/1/1

N2 - Digital signature, one of cryptographic primitives, provides the integrity, authentication and non-repudiation of messages. In the past decade, ID-based signature (IBS) based on bilinear pairings has attracted significant attention. And a large number of IBS schemes have been proposed and most of them are probabilistic. In the signing phase of those probabilistic IBS schemes, random numbers (or ephemeral secrets) are used to generate signatures. Ephemeral secrets could be compromised if they are pre-computed and stored in insecure memory. In such a case, one can reveal the private key of the signer from the corresponding signature, termed ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks. In this article, we define a novel security notion for IBS schemes to capture ESL attacks. Based on this notion, we propose the first IBS scheme resistant to ESL attacks, called the leakage-free IBS scheme. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we demonstrate that the proposed leakage-free IBS scheme is provably secure in the new security notion. When compared with the probabilistic IBS schemes, our scheme is demonstrated to have higher security with affordable price in performance.

AB - Digital signature, one of cryptographic primitives, provides the integrity, authentication and non-repudiation of messages. In the past decade, ID-based signature (IBS) based on bilinear pairings has attracted significant attention. And a large number of IBS schemes have been proposed and most of them are probabilistic. In the signing phase of those probabilistic IBS schemes, random numbers (or ephemeral secrets) are used to generate signatures. Ephemeral secrets could be compromised if they are pre-computed and stored in insecure memory. In such a case, one can reveal the private key of the signer from the corresponding signature, termed ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks. In this article, we define a novel security notion for IBS schemes to capture ESL attacks. Based on this notion, we propose the first IBS scheme resistant to ESL attacks, called the leakage-free IBS scheme. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we demonstrate that the proposed leakage-free IBS scheme is provably secure in the new security notion. When compared with the probabilistic IBS schemes, our scheme is demonstrated to have higher security with affordable price in performance.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84926625993&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84926625993&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/comjnl/bxt116

DO - 10.1093/comjnl/bxt116

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84926625993

VL - 58

SP - 750

EP - 757

JO - Computer Journal

JF - Computer Journal

SN - 0010-4620

IS - 4

ER -