Efficient Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol in the Continual Leakage eCK Model

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Based on users' permanent private keys and ephemeral secret keys (randomness secret values), authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols are used to construct a common session key between two session parties while authenticating each other. Recently, the design of leakage-resilient AKA (LR-AKA) resisting side-channel attacks has received significant attention from researchers. By side-channel attacks, an adversary is allowed to obtain fractional leakage information of private (secret) keys during the computation rounds of LR-AKA protocols. However, most LR-AKA protocols have a restriction, namely, the overall fractional leakage information must be bounded. In this paper, we propose an efficient LR-AKA protocol with overall unbounded leakage property in the continual leakage extended Canetti-Krawczyk model. Security analysis is given to demonstrate that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the generic bilinear group model. By comparisons, our protocol is better than the previously proposed LR-AKA protocols in terms of computation cost, security model, and leakage properties.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)17130-17142
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Access
Volume6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jan 26

Fingerprint

Costs
Side channel attack

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Materials Science(all)
  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

@article{59918c7f8f8e4e22a1d416e71ae9155f,
title = "Efficient Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol in the Continual Leakage eCK Model",
abstract = "Based on users' permanent private keys and ephemeral secret keys (randomness secret values), authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols are used to construct a common session key between two session parties while authenticating each other. Recently, the design of leakage-resilient AKA (LR-AKA) resisting side-channel attacks has received significant attention from researchers. By side-channel attacks, an adversary is allowed to obtain fractional leakage information of private (secret) keys during the computation rounds of LR-AKA protocols. However, most LR-AKA protocols have a restriction, namely, the overall fractional leakage information must be bounded. In this paper, we propose an efficient LR-AKA protocol with overall unbounded leakage property in the continual leakage extended Canetti-Krawczyk model. Security analysis is given to demonstrate that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the generic bilinear group model. By comparisons, our protocol is better than the previously proposed LR-AKA protocols in terms of computation cost, security model, and leakage properties.",
author = "Wu, {Jui Di} and Yuh-Min Tseng and Sen-Shan Huang",
year = "2018",
month = "1",
day = "26",
doi = "10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2799298",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "17130--17142",
journal = "IEEE Access",
issn = "2169-3536",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

}

Efficient Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol in the Continual Leakage eCK Model. / Wu, Jui Di; Tseng, Yuh-Min; Huang, Sen-Shan.

In: IEEE Access, Vol. 6, 26.01.2018, p. 17130-17142.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Efficient Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol in the Continual Leakage eCK Model

AU - Wu, Jui Di

AU - Tseng, Yuh-Min

AU - Huang, Sen-Shan

PY - 2018/1/26

Y1 - 2018/1/26

N2 - Based on users' permanent private keys and ephemeral secret keys (randomness secret values), authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols are used to construct a common session key between two session parties while authenticating each other. Recently, the design of leakage-resilient AKA (LR-AKA) resisting side-channel attacks has received significant attention from researchers. By side-channel attacks, an adversary is allowed to obtain fractional leakage information of private (secret) keys during the computation rounds of LR-AKA protocols. However, most LR-AKA protocols have a restriction, namely, the overall fractional leakage information must be bounded. In this paper, we propose an efficient LR-AKA protocol with overall unbounded leakage property in the continual leakage extended Canetti-Krawczyk model. Security analysis is given to demonstrate that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the generic bilinear group model. By comparisons, our protocol is better than the previously proposed LR-AKA protocols in terms of computation cost, security model, and leakage properties.

AB - Based on users' permanent private keys and ephemeral secret keys (randomness secret values), authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols are used to construct a common session key between two session parties while authenticating each other. Recently, the design of leakage-resilient AKA (LR-AKA) resisting side-channel attacks has received significant attention from researchers. By side-channel attacks, an adversary is allowed to obtain fractional leakage information of private (secret) keys during the computation rounds of LR-AKA protocols. However, most LR-AKA protocols have a restriction, namely, the overall fractional leakage information must be bounded. In this paper, we propose an efficient LR-AKA protocol with overall unbounded leakage property in the continual leakage extended Canetti-Krawczyk model. Security analysis is given to demonstrate that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the generic bilinear group model. By comparisons, our protocol is better than the previously proposed LR-AKA protocols in terms of computation cost, security model, and leakage properties.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85041356764&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85041356764&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2799298

DO - 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2799298

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85041356764

VL - 6

SP - 17130

EP - 17142

JO - IEEE Access

JF - IEEE Access

SN - 2169-3536

ER -