Comments on an ID-based authenticated group key agreement protocol with withstanding insider attacks

Tsu Yang Wu, Yuh-Min Tseng

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In PKC 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) protocol using bilinear pairings. Unfortunately, their protocol suffered from an impersonation attack and an insider colluding attack. In 2008, Choi et al. presented an improvement to resist insider attacks. In their modified protocol, they used an ID-based signature scheme on transcripts for binding them in a session to prevent replay of transcripts. In particular, they smartly used the batch verification technique to reduce the computational cost. In this paper, we first show that Choi et al.'s modified AGKA protocol still suffers from an insider colluding attack. Then, we prove that the batch verification of the adopted ID-based signature scheme in their modified protocol suffers from a forgery attack.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2638-2640
Number of pages3
JournalIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
VolumeE92-A
Issue number10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Jan 1

Fingerprint

Group Key Agreement
Key Agreement Protocol
Identity-based
Attack
Network protocols
Signature Scheme
Batch
Bilinear Pairings
Protein Kinase C
Resist
Computational Cost
Costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

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abstract = "In PKC 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) protocol using bilinear pairings. Unfortunately, their protocol suffered from an impersonation attack and an insider colluding attack. In 2008, Choi et al. presented an improvement to resist insider attacks. In their modified protocol, they used an ID-based signature scheme on transcripts for binding them in a session to prevent replay of transcripts. In particular, they smartly used the batch verification technique to reduce the computational cost. In this paper, we first show that Choi et al.'s modified AGKA protocol still suffers from an insider colluding attack. Then, we prove that the batch verification of the adopted ID-based signature scheme in their modified protocol suffers from a forgery attack.",
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