Attack and improve the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme

Ting Yi Chang, Mao Lun Chiang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


In this paper, we show that the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme is vulnerable to a universal forgery attack. This one malicious verifier is able to use previous signatures to forge the signer's authenticated encryption signature on any message. Two simple methods are presented to withstand this attack. One method also additionally provides the convertible property in the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme, which allows the verifier to convert the signature into an ordinary one. The converted signature can be verified by anyone, without revealing his/her secret key.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3025-3030
Number of pages6
JournalInternational Journal of Innovative Computing, Information and Control
Issue number10
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Oct 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Information Systems
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics

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