Abstract
In this paper, we show that the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme is vulnerable to a universal forgery attack. This one malicious verifier is able to use previous signatures to forge the signer's authenticated encryption signature on any message. Two simple methods are presented to withstand this attack. One method also additionally provides the convertible property in the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme, which allows the verifier to convert the signature into an ordinary one. The converted signature can be verified by anyone, without revealing his/her secret key.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3025-3030 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | International Journal of Innovative Computing, Information and Control |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue number | 10 |
| Publication status | Published - 2009 Oct 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Software
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Information Systems
- Computational Theory and Mathematics
Cite this
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Attack and improve the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme. / Chang, Ting Yi; Chiang, Mao Lun.
In: International Journal of Innovative Computing, Information and Control, Vol. 5, No. 10, 01.10.2009, p. 3025-3030.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Attack and improve the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme
AU - Chang, Ting Yi
AU - Chiang, Mao Lun
PY - 2009/10/1
Y1 - 2009/10/1
N2 - In this paper, we show that the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme is vulnerable to a universal forgery attack. This one malicious verifier is able to use previous signatures to forge the signer's authenticated encryption signature on any message. Two simple methods are presented to withstand this attack. One method also additionally provides the convertible property in the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme, which allows the verifier to convert the signature into an ordinary one. The converted signature can be verified by anyone, without revealing his/her secret key.
AB - In this paper, we show that the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme is vulnerable to a universal forgery attack. This one malicious verifier is able to use previous signatures to forge the signer's authenticated encryption signature on any message. Two simple methods are presented to withstand this attack. One method also additionally provides the convertible property in the Zhao-Liu authenticated encryption scheme, which allows the verifier to convert the signature into an ordinary one. The converted signature can be verified by anyone, without revealing his/her secret key.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70350506611&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=70350506611&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:70350506611
VL - 5
SP - 3025
EP - 3030
JO - International Journal of Innovative Computing, Information and Control
JF - International Journal of Innovative Computing, Information and Control
SN - 1349-4198
IS - 10
ER -