TY - JOUR
T1 - A short certificate-based signature scheme with provable security
AU - Hung, Ying Hao
AU - Huang, Sen Shan
AU - Tseng, Yuh Min
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to appreciate anonymous referees for their valuable comments and constructive suggestions. This research was partially supported by Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan, R.O.C., under grant no. MOST103 -2221-E-018-022-MY2.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - Certificate-based signature (CBS) is an attractive paradigm since it simultaneously solves the certificate revocation problem in conventional signatures and the key escrow problem in ID-based signatures. In particular, short certificate-based signatures are useful in bandwidth reduction for communication due to their short signature lengths. However, it is still a challenging and open problem to design a secure short certificate-based signature (SCBS) scheme. Recently, to solve this problem, Li et al. proposed an efficient SCBS scheme. However, in this article, we will show that Li et al.’s scheme is insecure against Type I adversary (i.e. uncertified entity) under an accredited security model. Moreover, we propose a new SCBS scheme with provable security. Based on the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption, we demonstrate that our SCBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the same accredited security model. When compared with previous SCBS schemes, our scheme is the first provably secure SCBS scheme while retaining efficiency.
AB - Certificate-based signature (CBS) is an attractive paradigm since it simultaneously solves the certificate revocation problem in conventional signatures and the key escrow problem in ID-based signatures. In particular, short certificate-based signatures are useful in bandwidth reduction for communication due to their short signature lengths. However, it is still a challenging and open problem to design a secure short certificate-based signature (SCBS) scheme. Recently, to solve this problem, Li et al. proposed an efficient SCBS scheme. However, in this article, we will show that Li et al.’s scheme is insecure against Type I adversary (i.e. uncertified entity) under an accredited security model. Moreover, we propose a new SCBS scheme with provable security. Based on the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption, we demonstrate that our SCBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the same accredited security model. When compared with previous SCBS schemes, our scheme is the first provably secure SCBS scheme while retaining efficiency.
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U2 - 10.5755/j01.itc.45.3.12814
DO - 10.5755/j01.itc.45.3.12814
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84988951461
VL - 45
SP - 243
EP - 253
JO - Information Technology and Control
JF - Information Technology and Control
SN - 1392-124X
IS - 3
ER -