Abstract
Recently, several identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocols from bilinear pairings were proposed. However, they all suffered from different types of insider (participants) colluding attacks. In this paper, we present a new IDAGKE protocol from bilinear pairings. In the random oracle model and under some security assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is a provably secure IDAGKE protocol providing forward secrecy. Meanwhile, it is secure against insider attacks.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 915-932 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Journal of Information Science and Engineering |
Volume | 27 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - 2011 May 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Software
- Human-Computer Interaction
- Hardware and Architecture
- Library and Information Sciences
- Computational Theory and Mathematics
Cite this
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A secure ID-Based authenticated group key exchange protocol resistant to insider attacks. / Wu, Tsu Yang; Tseng, Yuh Min; Yu, Ching Wen.
In: Journal of Information Science and Engineering, Vol. 27, No. 3, 01.05.2011, p. 915-932.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - A secure ID-Based authenticated group key exchange protocol resistant to insider attacks
AU - Wu, Tsu Yang
AU - Tseng, Yuh Min
AU - Yu, Ching Wen
PY - 2011/5/1
Y1 - 2011/5/1
N2 - Recently, several identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocols from bilinear pairings were proposed. However, they all suffered from different types of insider (participants) colluding attacks. In this paper, we present a new IDAGKE protocol from bilinear pairings. In the random oracle model and under some security assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is a provably secure IDAGKE protocol providing forward secrecy. Meanwhile, it is secure against insider attacks.
AB - Recently, several identity (ID)-based authenticated group key exchange (IDAGKE) protocols from bilinear pairings were proposed. However, they all suffered from different types of insider (participants) colluding attacks. In this paper, we present a new IDAGKE protocol from bilinear pairings. In the random oracle model and under some security assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is a provably secure IDAGKE protocol providing forward secrecy. Meanwhile, it is secure against insider attacks.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=79958112453&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79958112453
VL - 27
SP - 915
EP - 932
JO - Journal of Information Science and Engineering
JF - Journal of Information Science and Engineering
SN - 1016-2364
IS - 3
ER -