A robust multi-party key agreement protocol resistant to malicious participants

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

By its very nature, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol cannot provide participant and message authentication, so it must rely on an authenticated network channel. This paper presents the inability of two famous multi-party key agreement protocols to withstand malicious participant attacks, even though their protocols are based on the authenticated network channel. This attack involves a malicious participant disrupting the multi-party key agreement among honest participants. In this case, other honest participants do not correctly agree on a common key. Obviously, the malicious participant cannot obtain the common key either, and the communication confidentiality among participants is not breached. However, in some emergency situations or applications, a multi-party key agreement protocol design that is resistant to malicious participants is useful. Therefore, in this paper, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol resistant to malicious participants is proposed. The proposed robust protocol requires constant rounds to establish a common key. Each participant broadcasts a constant number of messages. Under the assumption of the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem and the random oracle model, we will show that the proposed protocol is provably secure against passive adversaries and malicious participants.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)480-487
Number of pages8
JournalComputer Journal
Volume48
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005 Oct 10

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Authentication
Communication

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

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A robust multi-party key agreement protocol resistant to malicious participants. / Tseng, Yuh Min.

In: Computer Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4, 10.10.2005, p. 480-487.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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