A Leakage-Resilient Certificateless Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Withstanding Side-Channel Attacks

Tsung Che Hsieh, Yuh Min Tseng, Sen Shan Huang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Certificateless public-key cryptography has conquered both the certificate management problem in the traditional public-key cryptography and the key escrow problem in the ID-based public-key cryptography. Certificateless authenticated key exchange (CLAKE) protocol is an important primitive of the certificateless public-key cryptography. A CLAKE protocol is employed to provide both mutual authentication and establishing a session key between two participators. Indeed, all conventional public-key cryptographies have encountered a new kind of attack, named 'side-channel attacks'. Fortunately, leakage-resilient cryptography is a flexible approach to withstand such attacks. However, the design of leakage-resilient CLAKE (LR-CLAKE) protocols is not studied. In the article, by extending the well-known extended-Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, we present the security notions (adversary model) of LR-CLAKE protocols, called continual-leakage-resilient eCK (CLReCK) model. The first LR-CLAKE protocol withstanding side-channel attacks is proposed. By employing the proof technique of the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we formally prove the security of our protocol in the CLReCK model.

Original languageEnglish
Article number9133077
Pages (from-to)121795-121810
Number of pages16
JournalIEEE Access
Volume8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Materials Science(all)
  • Engineering(all)

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